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The SSRC Library allows visitors to access materials related to self-sufficiency programs, practice and research. Visitors can view common search terms, conduct a keyword search or create a custom search using any combination of the filters at the left side of this page. To conduct a keyword search, type a term or combination of terms into the search box below, select whether you want to search the exact phrase or the words in any order, and click on the blue button to the right of the search box to view relevant results.

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  • Individual Author: Ha, Yoonsook; Ybarra, Marci
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2013

    Welfare reform devolved authority to states in designing and implementing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and child care subsidy programs, thereby creating substantial variation in both programs across states. TANF and child care subsidy programs are, in theory, designed to work together to support employment among low-income families, yet we have little information on how these two programs collectively impact work and family life among the target population. This study examines the intensity of TANF work requirements and generosity of child care subsidy provisions across states and the interaction of the two programs. Overall, we find that states with stringent work requirements do not typically provide generous child care subsidies. This article discusses the implications for families, policy, and social work practice in light of our findings. (author abstract)

    Welfare reform devolved authority to states in designing and implementing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and child care subsidy programs, thereby creating substantial variation in both programs across states. TANF and child care subsidy programs are, in theory, designed to work together to support employment among low-income families, yet we have little information on how these two programs collectively impact work and family life among the target population. This study examines the intensity of TANF work requirements and generosity of child care subsidy provisions across states and the interaction of the two programs. Overall, we find that states with stringent work requirements do not typically provide generous child care subsidies. This article discusses the implications for families, policy, and social work practice in light of our findings. (author abstract)

  • Individual Author: Holl, Jane L.; Oh, Elissa H.; Yoo, Joan; Amsden, Laura B.; Sohn, Min-Woong
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2012

    We examined how maternal work and welfare receipt are associated with children receiving recommended pediatric preventive care services. We identified American Academy of Pediatrics-recommended preventive care visits from medical records of children in the 1999-2004 Illinois Families Study: Child Well-Being. We used Illinois administrative data to identify whether mothers received welfare or worked during the period the visit was recommended, and we analyzed the child visit data using random-intercept logistic regressions that adjusted for child, maternal, and visit-specific characteristics. The 485 children (95%) meeting inclusion criteria made 41% of their recommended visits. Children were 60% more likely (adjusted odds ratios [AOR] = 1.60; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.27, 2.01) to make recommended visits when mothers received welfare but did not work compared with when mothers did not receive welfare and did not work. Children were 25% less likely (AOR= 0.75; 95% CI = 0.60, 0.94) to make preventive care visits during periods when mothers received welfare and worked...

    We examined how maternal work and welfare receipt are associated with children receiving recommended pediatric preventive care services. We identified American Academy of Pediatrics-recommended preventive care visits from medical records of children in the 1999-2004 Illinois Families Study: Child Well-Being. We used Illinois administrative data to identify whether mothers received welfare or worked during the period the visit was recommended, and we analyzed the child visit data using random-intercept logistic regressions that adjusted for child, maternal, and visit-specific characteristics. The 485 children (95%) meeting inclusion criteria made 41% of their recommended visits. Children were 60% more likely (adjusted odds ratios [AOR] = 1.60; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.27, 2.01) to make recommended visits when mothers received welfare but did not work compared with when mothers did not receive welfare and did not work. Children were 25% less likely (AOR= 0.75; 95% CI = 0.60, 0.94) to make preventive care visits during periods when mothers received welfare and worked compared with welfare only periods. The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families maternal work requirement may be a barrier to receiving recommended preventive pediatric health care. (author abstract)

  • Individual Author: Auspos, Patricia ; Miller, Cynthia; Hunter, Jo Anna
    Reference Type: Report
    Year: 2000

    This report examines implementation and impacts of Ramsey County's Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), a "work first" program. Chapter 1 lists key findings, provides an overview of the Ramsey County variant (MFIP-R) evaluation, and policy relevance of MFIP-R. Chapter 2 describes key features of MFIP-R and compares them with features of MFIP and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFCD)/Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (STRIDE); explains samples and data sources used in implementation and impact analyses; and presents demographic characteristics of samples. Chapter 3 discusses implementation of the single-parent MFIP-R and compares it with implementation of MFIP in Hennepin, Anoka, and Dakota Counties. Within that chapter, Section I discusses program success in communicating a strong work first message to recipients; Section II analyzes participation in MFIP-R. Section III provides information on employment and job retention among MFIP-R recipients and characteristics of their jobs. Chapter 4 analyzes impacts of MFIP-R compared with those of AFDC/...

    This report examines implementation and impacts of Ramsey County's Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), a "work first" program. Chapter 1 lists key findings, provides an overview of the Ramsey County variant (MFIP-R) evaluation, and policy relevance of MFIP-R. Chapter 2 describes key features of MFIP-R and compares them with features of MFIP and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFCD)/Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (STRIDE); explains samples and data sources used in implementation and impact analyses; and presents demographic characteristics of samples. Chapter 3 discusses implementation of the single-parent MFIP-R and compares it with implementation of MFIP in Hennepin, Anoka, and Dakota Counties. Within that chapter, Section I discusses program success in communicating a strong work first message to recipients; Section II analyzes participation in MFIP-R. Section III provides information on employment and job retention among MFIP-R recipients and characteristics of their jobs. Chapter 4 analyzes impacts of MFIP-R compared with those of AFDC/STRIDE on employment, earnings, and welfare receipt among the single-parent caseload within the first year after program entry. It compares these impacts with MFIP impacts in three urban counties. It reports on implementation and impacts of MFIP-R for two-parent families. Chapter 5 summarizes main conclusions. Appendixes are survey response analysis, data tables, and 14 references. (YLB) (ERIC abstract)

  • Individual Author: Hendra, Richard ; Michalopoulos, Charles ; Bloom, Dan
    Reference Type: Report
    Year: 2001

    This document was prepared as part of a large-scale evaluation of Connecticut’s Jobs First welfare reform initiative. Implemented statewide in 1996, Jobs First includes a 21-month time limit on cash assistance receipt, generous financial  work incentives, and other features. Its primary goal is to reduce welfare use and increase self-sufficiency through work. The Jobs First evaluation is being conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, under a contract with the Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS).

    To facilitate the evaluation, between January 1996 and February 1997, several thousand welfare applicants and recipients in two DSS offices (Manchester and New Haven) were assigned, at random, to one of two groups: the Jobs First group, which is subject to the welfare reforms, or the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) group, which is subject to the prior welfare rules. The two groups are being tracked over time, and any differences that emerge between them  – for example, in employment rates...

    This document was prepared as part of a large-scale evaluation of Connecticut’s Jobs First welfare reform initiative. Implemented statewide in 1996, Jobs First includes a 21-month time limit on cash assistance receipt, generous financial  work incentives, and other features. Its primary goal is to reduce welfare use and increase self-sufficiency through work. The Jobs First evaluation is being conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, under a contract with the Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS).

    To facilitate the evaluation, between January 1996 and February 1997, several thousand welfare applicants and recipients in two DSS offices (Manchester and New Haven) were assigned, at random, to one of two groups: the Jobs First group, which is subject to the welfare reforms, or the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) group, which is subject to the prior welfare rules. The two groups are being tracked over time, and any differences that emerge between them  – for example, in employment rates or welfare payment amounts – can reliably be attributed to Jobs First because there were no systematic differences between the groups’ members when they entered the study, and because both groups have experienced the same general economic and social conditions. Such differences are known as the program’s effects or impacts.

    In early 2000, MDRC completed a comprehensive interim report on Jobs First, including data on the program’s implementation and estimates of its impacts on employment, public assistance receipt, income, and other outcomes, in the two years after people were assigned to the two groups. This report updates the impact estimates through three years of follow-up. Key findings include:

    · Jobs First continues to have a positive impact on employment. The Jobs First group had higher employment rates and higher average earnings than the AFDC group in the first two years of the follow-up period, and this trend continued in Year 3. However, it appears that the program’s impact on employment began to fade in Year 3, and its impact on average earnings disappeared by the end of that year.

    · Jobs First generated substantial reductions in cash assistance receipt and payments in Year 3. Though Jobs First initially increased cash assistance payments due to its generous financial work incentive (a rule that allowed many people to retain their welfare grants after going to work), the pattern reversed when Jobs First group members began to reach the 21-month time limit near the end of the second year of follow-up. In Year 3, Jobs First reduced cash assistance receipt by 21 percent and reduced average cash assistance payments by 19 percent. 

    · The Jobs First and AFDC groups had about the same average income in Year 3 although, consistent with the program’s goals, the Jobs First group derived a greater proportion of its income from earnings. Jobs First substantially raised family income in the period before people began reaching the time limit; the financial work incentive allowed many people to supplement their earnings with welfare grants. The pattern changed abruptly when people began reaching the time limit and, in Year 3, reductions in cash assistance and Food Stamps almost entirely offset increases in earnings, leaving the two groups with about the same income. In addition, a small group of families appeared to be losing income as a result of the program. However, it is important to note that the overall pattern of Year 3 results was consistent with the program’s primary goal of increasing work and reducing reliance on welfare. 

    · The most impressive employment gains continue to be experienced by the most disadvantaged subgroup. In Year 3, Jobs First increased employment by 12 percentage points and earnings by 40 percent among those who entered Jobs First as long-term welfare recipients with no high school diploma and no recent work history. However, due to growing declines in AFDC/TFA benefits (presumably as the most disadvantaged sample members began to reach the time limit in larger numbers), early increases in total income for this subgroup disappeared in Year 3. In sharp contrast, sample members who were least disadvantaged seemed to experience little benefit from Jobs First.

    · Only a small fraction of the Jobs First group received benefits continuously through the three years, and many of those who did worked while on welfare. Although many of the recipients who reach Jobs First’s time limit are granted extensions, only about 6 percent of the Jobs First group received 35 or 36 countable months of cash assistance during the three-year study period (in other words, they received welfare more or less continuously and were not granted exemptions that stopped their time-limit clocks). When compared with other Jobs First group members, the continuous recipients were less likely to have a high school diploma, had longer histories of welfare receipt before entering Jobs First, and had more children. There were also much more likely to be African-American and to live in public or subsidized housing. Many of these individuals worked a substantial amount during the follow-up period, although their earnings were low. If this group is of concern, especially as the 60-month federal time limit approaches, DSS and its employment services partners will probably need to target them for special intensive services.

    For the most part, the updated findings show a continuation of trends apparent at the end of the follow-up period for the interim report. However, more  definitive evidence about the long term effects of Jobs First will have to wait for the final report, scheduled for late 2001. The final report will follow the groups for four years, present the results of a survey of about 2,400 Jobs First and AFDC group members, and examine Jobs First’s impacts on the children of participants. Because there are still several critical open questions, and because the final report will be available relatively soon, it would seem prudent to delay making major changes in Jobs First until the final results of the study are known. (author abstract)

  • Individual Author: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
    Reference Type: Regulation
    Year: 1999

    The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) issues regulations governing key provisions of the new welfare block grant program enacted in 1996—the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, program. It replaces the national welfare program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the related programs known as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS) and the Emergency Assistance (EA) program. These rules reflect new Federal, State, and Tribal relationships in the administration of welfare programs; a new focus on moving recipients into work; and a new emphasis on program information, measurement, and performance regulatory reform (author abstract). 

    64 Fed. Reg. 17720 (1999). 

     

    The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) issues regulations governing key provisions of the new welfare block grant program enacted in 1996—the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, program. It replaces the national welfare program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the related programs known as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS) and the Emergency Assistance (EA) program. These rules reflect new Federal, State, and Tribal relationships in the administration of welfare programs; a new focus on moving recipients into work; and a new emphasis on program information, measurement, and performance regulatory reform (author abstract). 

    64 Fed. Reg. 17720 (1999). 

     

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