Skip to main content
Back to Top

SSRC Library

The SSRC Library allows visitors to access materials related to self-sufficiency programs, practice and research. Visitors can view common search terms, conduct a keyword search or create a custom search using any combination of the filters at the left side of this page. To conduct a keyword search, type a term or combination of terms into the search box below, select whether you want to search the exact phrase or the words in any order, and click on the blue button to the right of the search box to view relevant results.

Writing a paper? Working on a literature review? Citing research in a funding proposal? Use the SSRC Citation Assistance Tool to compile citations.

  • Conduct a search and filter parameters as desired.
  • "Check" the box next to the resources for which you would like a citation.
  • Select "Download Selected Citation" at the top of the Library Search Page.
  • Select your export style:
    • Text File.
    • RIS Format.
    • APA format.
  • Select submit and download your citations.

The SSRC Library includes resources which may be available only via journal subscription. The SSRC may be able to provide users without subscription access to a particular journal with a single use copy of the full text.  Please email the SSRC with your request.

The SSRC Library collection is constantly growing and new research is added regularly. We welcome our users to submit a library item to help us grow our collection in response to your needs.


  • Individual Author: Ventry, Dennis J. Jr.
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2000

    This paper uses the political history and pre-history of the EITC to describe how the politics of welfare reform influence tax policies that function as social policy. It suggests that the economic tradeoffs inherent in the formulation of tax-transfer programs are also political tradeoffs. It examines policy choices between costs and labor supply incentives, as well as those between ease of participation and compliance rates. This paper concludes that although economic analysis influenced the creation and development of the EITC, political factors, not economics, animated the history of the program. (author abstract)

    This paper uses the political history and pre-history of the EITC to describe how the politics of welfare reform influence tax policies that function as social policy. It suggests that the economic tradeoffs inherent in the formulation of tax-transfer programs are also political tradeoffs. It examines policy choices between costs and labor supply incentives, as well as those between ease of participation and compliance rates. This paper concludes that although economic analysis influenced the creation and development of the EITC, political factors, not economics, animated the history of the program. (author abstract)

  • Individual Author: Eissa, Nada; Hoynes, Hilary
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2011

    This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue that several expansions show that real responses to taxes are important. We use tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms to the credit. Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters. (author abstract)

    This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue that several expansions show that real responses to taxes are important. We use tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms to the credit. Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters. (author abstract)

  • Individual Author: Blumenthal, Marsha; Erard, Brian; Ho, Chih–Chin
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2005

    We explore participation and compliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) using a unique administrative data source. Among eligible households with a legal filing requirement, we find that EITC participation is high and that it responded positively to the rise in real benefit amounts during the 1990s. Although participation has also improved among households with no legal filing obligation, it remains rather low and may actually be inferior to participation within more traditional welfare programs. Compliance with the EITC has been a persistent problem. We find that erroneous claims are much more common among households who satisfy some (but not all) program requirements. We find no evidence of a deterrent role by tax practitioners with respect to improper claims. (author abstract)

    We explore participation and compliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) using a unique administrative data source. Among eligible households with a legal filing requirement, we find that EITC participation is high and that it responded positively to the rise in real benefit amounts during the 1990s. Although participation has also improved among households with no legal filing obligation, it remains rather low and may actually be inferior to participation within more traditional welfare programs. Compliance with the EITC has been a persistent problem. We find that erroneous claims are much more common among households who satisfy some (but not all) program requirements. We find no evidence of a deterrent role by tax practitioners with respect to improper claims. (author abstract)

  • Individual Author: Hamilton, Jonathan H.
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2010

    What lessons do we learn from optimal tax theory for the design of income redistribution programs? I modify a standard model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with discrete types to consider differences in both earning ability and the disutility of effort. This gives a role for “workfare” in the optimal tax policy. The existence of screening mechanisms can play a role in explaining non-participation in cash and in-kind redistribution programs, including Progresa-Oportunidades, Lifeline Telephone subsidies, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Stigma can increase efficiency of a redistribution program by discouraging participation by individuals near the eligibility thresholds. The Family Assistance Program proposed in the early 1970s lacked adequate stigma for nonworkers, which contributed to a lack of political support. In contrast, the current Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides greater benefits to workers than to nonworkers. Thus the EITC does not require any stigma to screen out individuals who do not work from...

    What lessons do we learn from optimal tax theory for the design of income redistribution programs? I modify a standard model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with discrete types to consider differences in both earning ability and the disutility of effort. This gives a role for “workfare” in the optimal tax policy. The existence of screening mechanisms can play a role in explaining non-participation in cash and in-kind redistribution programs, including Progresa-Oportunidades, Lifeline Telephone subsidies, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Stigma can increase efficiency of a redistribution program by discouraging participation by individuals near the eligibility thresholds. The Family Assistance Program proposed in the early 1970s lacked adequate stigma for nonworkers, which contributed to a lack of political support. In contrast, the current Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides greater benefits to workers than to nonworkers. Thus the EITC does not require any stigma to screen out individuals who do not work from obtaining benefits. Reasons for separate income support programs for nonworkers and for workers are discussed. (Author abstract)

  • Individual Author: Dowd, Timothy
    Reference Type: Journal Article
    Year: 2005

    Since its enactment in 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has evolved from a small program to alleviate some of the tax burden of the payroll and income tax on low–income working parents to become a significant part of the Federal government's redistribution efforts. This paper presents preliminary work from a unique data set and is meant to raise questions as well as present new evidence regarding the EITC. This study examines a panel of taxpayers over 15 years to determine the extent to which the EITC acts as a safety net for workers experiencing temporary income and employment shocks. I find that between 40 and 50 percent of EITC recipients claim the EITC for short periods of time (one to two years). Finally, I provide descriptive information about the characteristics of temporary versus more permanent EITC recipients, with a particular focus on the effects of changes in the economy and state welfare policies. (author abstract)

    Since its enactment in 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has evolved from a small program to alleviate some of the tax burden of the payroll and income tax on low–income working parents to become a significant part of the Federal government's redistribution efforts. This paper presents preliminary work from a unique data set and is meant to raise questions as well as present new evidence regarding the EITC. This study examines a panel of taxpayers over 15 years to determine the extent to which the EITC acts as a safety net for workers experiencing temporary income and employment shocks. I find that between 40 and 50 percent of EITC recipients claim the EITC for short periods of time (one to two years). Finally, I provide descriptive information about the characteristics of temporary versus more permanent EITC recipients, with a particular focus on the effects of changes in the economy and state welfare policies. (author abstract)

Sort by

Topical Area(s)

Popular Searches

Source

Year

Year ranges from 1993 to 2018

Reference Type

Research Methodology

Geographic Focus

Target Populations